Abstract-Designing a dependable control system requires accurate methods to evaluate efficiently the dependability level of one given component architecture. This evaluation is crucial to determine the risks associated with system failures, and the remaining properties after fault occurrences. The dependability level of a control system depends not only on the kind of component failures that may occur, but also on the ordered sequences of the failure appearance. Classical evaluation methods, i.e. Fault Trees or Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, are not appropriate to handle these sequences. Our paper contributes on this aspect, and proposes a complete design methodology for dependable systems. This methodology uses ordered sequences of multiple failures to evaluate accurately the dependability level of all possible system's equipment architectures. Starting with the hierarchical functional decomposition of the system, the first step is to identify the dreaded events. Thus, the faulty behaviors of all possible system architectures are characterized with temporal operators. The set of system's operational architectures is finally determined by solving an optimization problem that considers both dependability objectives, and cost constraints. This methodology is applied to design a fire detection system for a railroad transportation system. In this paper, a complete methodology to design dependable control systems is presented. The innovative feature of this methodology is that it attempts to take into account time ordered sequences of failures. A new representation, called improved multi-fault tree, is defined. This tool allows us first to model failure relationships between functions, and second to evaluate the dependability level of a set of equipment architectures by the use of time ordered sequences of failures. Our design method provides a set of optimal architectures with given costs, and dependability levels. The designer can choose among these solutions trading among the costs, and dependability level specifications. The comparison between the new approach and the classical dependability method shows that the set of solutions for the multi-fault tree is smaller than the set of solutions for the classical one. The set is smaller, but the solutions are better because the new approach integrates temporal functions, and evaluates more precisely the level of dependability than with the traditional one.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A control system is composed of physical components, sensors, and actuators which are organized to achieve a set of missions, not only in normal situations but also in faulty cases. In the design stage, the objective of the designer is to find a feasible architecture that guarantees an acceptable level 0018-9529/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE of dependability [1] . This level of dependability is evaluated either in a quantitative way using failure rates [2] , or using qualitative characteristics such as the set of failures that leads to a given dreaded event [3] . Our work is concerned with the second kind of approach. Faulty system's behaviors depend not only on the system's functions that are affected by the faulty components, but also on the temporal ordered sequence of failures'appearance. Fault Trees, or Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) are classical methods used to evaluate and analyse qualitative dependability characteristics. However, they are not well suited to take into account these sequences of failures [4] , [5] . Other methods based on Monte Carlo techniques, Petri Nets, and Markov Graphs may be used to take into account such temporal sequences; however, they present some challenges like a long simulation time, and an exponential increase of combinatorial states or places [6] - [8] . As a consequence, these methods, developed to assess one existing physical system, are not well adapted to design such control system architecture. Indeed, designing a system requires fast evaluation tools and optimization algorithms to find the best architecture of components among a set of numerous possible architectures. This paper presents a novel design methodology for dependable control systems. Our method takes explicitly into account the ordered sequences of failures. A graphical representation, called "improved multi-fault tree" is provided. This tool allows us to represent all possible systems architectures that fulfill the dependability specifications. Improved multi-fault trees are derived from classical fault trees by adding temporal operators that are useful to represent the temporal constraints on the system's faulty behaviors. The dependability level of all possible system architectures may be quickly yet accurately evaluated using this new tree.
The design methodology is divided into two phases: the first phase aims at modeling dependable control systems by taking into account the ordered sequences of failures, while the second one allows us to obtain the set of possible system's operational architectures that fulfill dependability objectives for a given cost.
This methodology is applied to design a safety system for a railroad wagon. This railroad wagon presents significant risks for itself, like derailment and fire, because of its transported goods, i.e. trucks, and needs safety systems to improve its dependability level. It has been shown in [9] , [10] that a fire detection system increases the dependability level of the railroad wagon. In this paper, we focus on the design of such fire detection system. The rest of this paper is divided into three parts. In Section II, general concepts related to the design of dependable systems are summarized, and the contribution is pointed out clearly. In Section III, the design methodology is presented. Finally, in Section IV, the methodology is applied to design a fire detection system for a railroad transportation system. A comparison with a classical method is provided that shows clearly the efficiency and the benefit of the proposed approach. Fig. 2 . Dependency between the four dependability characteristics [20] .
II. GENERAL CONCEPTS RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF DEPENDABLE CONTROL SYSTEMS

A. Control Systems Design Methodology
The design of a control system involves three kinds of architectures [11] - [13] : the functional architecture, the equipment architecture, and the operational architecture.
The functional architecture is built according to the functional specifications (Fig. 1, activity A1) , and represents the links between the system's functions. This model is based on a hierarchical functional decomposition: main functions are broken up into sub-functions, and so on. This decomposition is achieved when basic components are reached (Fig. 1 , activity A2).
The equipment architecture represents the system equipment list. This architecture reflects the choices made for the equipment (Fig. 1, activity A3 ). These choices are improved to satisfy dependability criteria (Fig. 1, activity A5 ). The equipment architecture may contain hardware, and software components, as well as communication systems.
The operational architecture is defined as the projection, using several constraints, of a functional architecture on one equipment architecture (Fig. 1, activity A4 ). The operational architecture takes into account constraints linked to the dependability level, and to the cost objective (Fig. 1, activity  A6) . If the objectives are not met, the feedback loop between activities A6 and A1 provides information that can be used to improve system performance, like modification of functions, or integration of redundant components.
In the projection step ( Fig. 1, activity A4 ), the evaluation of the dependability level is either static or dynamic. The static evaluation is a probabilistic evaluation of dependability characteristics. The dynamic evaluation considers the temporal ordered sequences of failures, which are called scenarios, that lead the system to a dangerous state.
B. Dependability Characteristics
A uniform way to consider the four dependability characteristics, i.e. availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety [14] - [17] , is through the concept of the dreaded event [18] . For instance, the events "incapacity to achieve its mission," "shutdown," or "dangerous behavior" are related to these dependability characteristics. Dreaded events encompass dependability characteristics in a qualitative, but comprehensive way.
A dependable system is a system that carries out the function it was designed to do, without incident infringing its availability, and without accident endangering its safety [19] . Fig. 2 shows that the four dependability aspects are not independent [20] . Designing a dependable system means finding the best availability-reliability-safety-maintainability combination.
C. Dependability Evaluation Methods
The evaluation of the system's dependability characteristics can be carried out by several methods. Many research books and papers [21] , [22] , and International Standards dedicated to dependability [23] , are devoted to these methods.
Fault trees, and reliability block diagrams are classical static methods that are focused on a probabilistic evaluation of dependability characteristics. These methods allow one to isolate the system's parts that are sensitive to failures. Without significant augmentation, these methods do not take into account ordered sequences of failures, and they do not consider temporal dependencies between functions [5] . As it will be shown later, these temporal aspects are very important in the accurate evaluation of dependability characteristics of an equipment architecture.
Other methods based on Petri nets or Markov graphs aim at including these temporal characteristics. These models can integrate various failure rates or transitions according to the states of a system. They also take into account repairable states of system components, and temporal dependencies between functions. However, these models are often not easy to construct and study. They require efficient mathematical methods, and can suffer from a combinatorial explosion of their states [6] , [7] if not properly managed.
The idea to combine both static and dynamic methods to solve construction and exploitation problems, and to reduce the combinatorial explosion problem, was studied in a number of ways:
• Dugan [24] developed the concept of dynamic fault trees. This tree has the ability to capture sequence dependencies in operational systems. It can be evaluated via a combination of Binary Decision Diagrams, and Markov processes.
• Bouissou [8] - [25] defined new semantics for fault trees augmented with a new kind of link called a "trigger" by using Markov processes. This new formalism is called "Boolean Logic Driven Markov Process" (BDMP). This formalism allows one to reduce the combinatorial explosion of states when studying huge systems. • Cepin & Mavko [26] extended a classical fault tree with a "house" events matrix, and temporal function dependencies. The "house" events matrix models connections between gates and events of the fault tree. It also represents the system operation, and its environment. These methods allow the evaluation the dependability characteristics of one existing system component architecture. Our objective, which is to design a control system with given dependability specifications, is quite different. This motivates the development of a new static/dynamic model.
Our new model, called improved multi-fault tree, is based on classical fault trees. Nevertheless, it takes into account not only the sequences of multiple temporal ordered events, but also the temporal dependencies between functions. This inclusion allows the accurate evaluation of the dependability level. In fact, it is very important to consider the temporal order of fault events (also called failures) from the design stage because consequences on dependability characteristics are not the same if this order of events changes. Indeed, consequences change because the physical system under consideration has its own state evolution. Temporal dependencies between functions are represented with temporal operators. Furthermore, our tree is improved for the design purpose by adding alternative nodes, and associative nodes. These nodes will show all possibilities of component combinations, and allow us to handle multiple system faulty behaviors.
III. PRESENTATION OF THE DESIGN METHODOLOGY
The main objectives of our design methodology are -to model dependable control systems by taking into account the faulty scenarios, -to evaluate accurately and efficiently the dependability level of an overall system, and -to obtain a set of realizable system's operational architectures, with each solution characterized by its dependability level, and its global cost. The design methodology is divided into two phases: the modeling phase, and the optimization phase. These two phases will be defined in this section (parts B, and C).
A. Definitions and Properties
This section defines and formalizes concepts and notions that will be used in the proposed design method. A scenario is first defined, and its parameters are characterized. Operators of the improved multi-fault tree and their properties are also presented. The property of an operator is called here a composition law. Cost, dependability level, and the set of systems are also defined.
1) Failure, Scenario, and Relative Reliability Coefficient: A failure is a non-desired event. It is associated with the transition of a component or a set of components from an acceptable state towards a non-desired state. In this non-desired state, it is supposed that the component does not achieve accurately its mission. It is supposed in the following that the system is not repairable, that is to say a component can't return after a failure to its initial state. From the system point of view, a dreaded event corresponds to a particular failure.
Definition 1: A scenario corresponds to a sequence of failures that brings the system to a precise dreaded event . In other words, a scenario is a time-ordered set of failures denoted by .
(
where is the failure which appears at position in scenario . Definition 2: (Scenario, and Set of Scenarios) Let be the set of all scenarios leading the system to the dreaded event . Let denote one element of .
where denotes the th element of . Definition 3: (Relative Reliability Coefficient) The relative reliability coefficient, defined for a given failure , and denoted by , characterizes the probability that the failure occurs when the system realizes one given mission.
In fact, RRC is introduced to differentiate two components that realize the same function, but have different robustness levels. Classically, as in references [14] - [16] , the reliability is defined by where is the failure rate. Consider the failure probability . For a given failure mode , the relation between the failure probability of a reference component, and the failure probability of a component which is characterized by , is which leads to Generally speaking, the RRC is a function of the duration of the considered mission, and of the failure rate of the component.
refers to a reference (standard) component, while refers to a component which is more robust (reliable) than a standard component. For instance, if for a given failure mode of a component, the failure probability of this component is equal to the failure probability of two reference components.
The concept of RRC can be extended to a scenario, and characterizes its occurrence probability in a qualitative way.
Definition 4: (RRC of a Scenario) For a given scenario composed by a set of failures with , is the sum of of each failure in .
Definition 5: ( of a Set of Scenarios) for the set is the minimal RRC of all scenarios contained in .
Given a particular dreaded event, this value expresses a fictive number of failures. This fictive number corresponds to the equivalent number of failures that the system can tolerate before this event occurs.
Definition 6: (Set of Minimal Scenarios of a Set of Scenarios) The set of minimal scenarios of , denoted by , is a subset of that contains all the scenarios whose RRC is . OR operator. To take into account the ordered sequences of failures, it is necessary to add two other operators: the PAND operator, and the SEQ operator [27] , [28] . An improved multifault tree is thus obtained. In the modeling phase, these operators represent relations between different failures of functions, sub-functions, and components in the improved multifault tree. They also have computational properties called composition laws that are applied for the treatment of the improved multi-fault tree in the optimization phase.
Let us consider two -independent dreaded events A and B, such that C results from the association of A and B with one of the operators. , , and are the minimal scenarios associated with A, B, and C respectively.
The AND operator allows us to represent the case when the failure C occurs immediately after the occurrence of the 2 failures A and B.
Property 1: With AND B, the parameters of C can be evaluated thanks to relations (7) and (8):
The OR operator is used when failure C occurs immediately after the occurrence of failure A, or failure B.
Property 2: With OR B, the parameters of C can be evaluated thanks to relations (9)-(11):
Definition 8: (PAND Operator) The PAND operator is a temporal operator, and is used when failure C occurs after the consecutive occurrence of A followed by B.
This operator is useful when the consequences of two component failures are different according to their order of occurrence. This case appears when a safety component is used, and cannot avoid a dangerous situation if it fails first.
Property 3: With PAND B, the parameters of C can be evaluated thanks to two relations:
(13) Definition 9: (SEQ Operator) The SEQ operator is used when failure C occurs after the consecutive occurrence of A followed by B. The difference is that the SEQ operator considers that no component failure leading to the occurrence of the dreaded event B occurs before the occurrence of dreaded event A. This operator is useful when passive redundancies are used. In this case, the replacement function is idle, and starts only when the main function fails, thus the failure of the replacement system may only occur after the failure of the main system. Property 4: With SEQ B, the parameters of C can be evaluated thanks to relations (14) and (15) .
3) Comparisons Between Dependability Levels and Between Systems:
Definition 10: (Equivalent Systems) Two systems (or components) are equivalent if they can achieve the same function, and as a consequence if the same dreaded events can be considered for these two systems.
Definition 11: (Dependability Level for a Dreaded Event) For a system , and for the dreaded event , let us denote as the dependability level formed by the couple . For a given system, this couple characterizes the probability that the dreaded event occurs. Thus, it can be used to compare several systems. 
Definition 12: (Comparison Between Dependability Levels for a Same Dreaded Event)
For two equivalent systems and , and for the same dreaded event , the dependability level of is said to be greater than the dependability level of , which is denoted by , if these relations are verified: (16) This relation expresses that the dreaded event occurs with less probability for than for due to • a higher number of failures in case of , or • a reduced number of sequences even if the number of failures is the same for and .
Definition 13:
The dependability levels are said to be identical if , and . Definition 14: (Dependability Level of a System) For a system (or a component) associated with a number of dreaded events , the set of all is denoted by .
This set expresses the ability of the considered system to tolerate the failures for various dreaded events.
Definition 15: (Comparison Between Dependability Levels of Equivalent Systems) Let us consider two equivalent systems and , and a set of dreaded events . The dependability level is said to be greater than if (18) expresses that the first system may better tolerate the failures than the second one.
Definition 16: (Cost of a System) A component is associated with a value corresponding to its cost. For a system , its cost is the sum of individual costs of its components.
(19)
Definition 17: (Characteristics of a System) A system S is entirely characterized by its cost, and its dependability level. These characteristics are denoted by .
Thanks to their characteristics, two equivalent systems can be compared.
Definition 18: (Comparison of Systems)
The system is said to be better than , which corresponds to , if
4) Definition 19: (Optimal Systems)
For a set of equivalent systems, the set of optimal systems is defined by (22) In the two following subsections, the design methodology of control systems is explained. This methodology uses ordered sequences of failures to evaluate the cost, and dependability level of equipment architectures. It also identifies the dreaded events of a control system, lists all the equipment architectures, and finally presents the obtained set of optimal operational architectures.
B. Modeling Phase
The first phase of the design procedure is to represent all potential, realizable component architectures. This model is built using two dependent activities: the first one describes the system based on a functional decomposition, while the second adds the failure modes, and failure relationships. The functional decomposition can be improved when failure modes are defined. Indeed, the possibilities of redundancies or fault detections may be easily identified knowing the failure modes.
1) Hierarchical Model:
In our design methodology, the model of the system is based on a functional hierarchical analysis represented by a tree. This analysis is often used to model control systems [19] - [29] .
Three types of nodes are used: the associative node, the alternative node, and the elementary node.
• The first type of node corresponds to an associative relationship. It expresses that a complex function requires, to be realized, a set of necessary sub-functions. For instance, in Fig. 3(a) , a basic control loop function needs (or is composed by) a measurement function, a control function, and an acting function. • The second type is an alternative node. It is used to propose various possibilities of performing a function. For instance, in Fig. 3(b) , for a measurement function, the designer can propose to use a single sensor, an analytical estimation function, or a set of redundant sensors. Thanks to this node, different solutions can be envisaged.
• The last type of node is an elementary node. It corresponds to a basic function associated with a single component. This type of node forms the leaves of the hierarchical decomposition.
2) Improved Multi-Fault Tree:
The functional hierarchical decomposition gives the skeleton of the multi-fault tree. With the aim of determining its behavior when a failure occurs, it has to be completed with a description of possible faults, and their effect.
This phase consists of associating to each node the set of failure modes that affect the accomplishment of the corresponding function. For complex functions, the relationships between their failures and those of their sub-functions have to be added. The operators AND, OR, PAND, and SEQ will be used for that purpose. For example, in Fig. 4 , the relationship between failures may be For the last elementary nodes, the RRC associated with each failure mode allows us to define if the component, which is proposed to realize the function, is a standard, a robust, or a safe one.
For the alternative nodes, the set of failures is not necessarily the same for all proposed alternatives.
In fact, some failure modes cannot appear for some alternatives due to the considered technology. To handle this special case, a very large value will be affected to the corresponding RRC.
The obtained improved multi-fault tree describes the various different technological realizations of the system, and characterizes the faulty behaviors of the system thanks to the indirect relationships between failure component at the bottom of the decomposition, and failure of the mission at the top.
C. Optimization Phase
The aim of the optimization phase is to determine the best control architecture systems among all the potential architectures described by the improved multi-fault tree. A bottom-up approach is proposed that is comparable to a branch and bound method [30] .
The general principle is to determine the optimal set of solutions for each node of the hierarchical model. For the last el- ementary nodes, the set of solutions is composed only with a single solution characterized by the cost of the associated component, and by the RRC attributed to each of its failure modes. For the upper levels composed with associative nodes and elementary nodes, the set of solutions is built according to the set of its lower functions. For an alternative node, this set is determined from the union of various solutions proposed by each possibility of realization. Thanks to the union of different sets of solutions, and thanks to the operator of comparison (cf. Definition 18), the optimal set is easily built. For the associative nodes, the possible solutions of realization are deduced one after one by scrutinizing all combinations of solutions proposed by each required function. For a particular combination, the cost of the resulting solution is given by the sum of the costs of the solution retained for each required function, while its dependability level is established from the dependability parameters that are evaluated thanks to the use of the relations corresponding to the operator associated with each failure modes. The optimal set is obtained by the union of all found solutions, and according to the comparison criterion.
Whatever the considered node (associative or alternative), because potential solutions are found one after one, the new one can be immediately compared to those previously found, and the optimal set can be built progressively. More precisely, a new potential solution is added to the optimal set only if no better solution exists in this set. In the same way, when a new solution is added, if other solutions are worse than the new one, they are removed from this set. At the end, this methodology provides the accurate optimal set as plotted in Fig. 5 .
For very huge systems, this optimization method may not be applied due to state explosion. Other methods, such as genetic algorithms [31] , may be used instead.
IV. CASE STUDY: DESIGN OF A CONTROL SYSTEM FOR A RAILROAD WAGON
The design methodology is applied below to a railroad system. First, we present problems associated with a railroad system, and the needs to design control systems for a railroad wagon. Then, the methodology to design safe control systems for this wagon is applied. Finally, some results, and an example of an obtained operational architecture for a fire protection system are presented.
A. Presentations of the Railroad System, and the Case Study
Railroad system is a general term indicating all the systems that carry rail freight trucks. There are many projects around the In comparison with classical trains, a railroad system must present additional dependability requirements, and other needs like fire protection, protection against external aggressions, and load monitoring. The design of a smart wagon answers these needs [9] , [10] . This wagon will have additional features that increase the dependability level of the global railroad system. Our methodology is illustrated by designing one of the new features for a smart wagon: an Automatic Fire Protection System (AFPS). The design of AFPS has been the subject of intensive investigation [32] - [35] . Our objective is to obtain a control architecture for such AFPS with a good compromise between cost, and dependability level. Fig. 6 shows the hierarchical functional model of the AFPS. This system has three missions: to detect fires, to notify system's operators (train driver for example), and to extinguish fires by the use of a fire fighting system. These missions are achieved by one or two control systems. The fire detection part of this system is composed of smoke detectors, 6 and heat sensors. The notification part consists of a data processing system composed of a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), and the power supply. The fire fighting system is activated by relays.
B. Modeling Phase 1) Hierarchical Model:
Basic components are described in Table I . Several types of components (standard, safe, and smart) with different financial costs may be chosen. These types of components correspond to different robustness levels (Definition 3). Moreover, four types of redundancies may be chosen: active, passive, serial, and parallel. Serial, and parallel redundancies refer to their corresponding component organizations. For an active redundancy, components fulfill their function at the same time; and for a passive redundancy, the second component is used when the first one has failed.
The general structure of the control AFPS is shown on Fig. 7 . A PLC system produces an alarm triggered by data coming from the detection system, and also starts a fire fighting system using relays.
2) Construction of the Improved Multi-Fault Tree: For sake of conciseness, only the two missions of detect fires and notify the system's operators are considered here. The first step in constructing the improved multi-fault tree is to define the dreaded events. Two dreaded events are considered:
• No fire alarm is activated by the PLC system when a fire is present. This dreaded event is associated with the system's safety level.
• False alarm i.e. the control system activates a fire alarm in the absence of fire. This dreaded event is associated with the system's availability level. The second step of construction is to associate to each node of the hierarchical tree the set of failure modes that affect the accomplishment of the corresponding function.
For example, in Fig. 6 , the detection of the fire can be accomplished in 3 ways (alternative node): detecting smoke and heat simultaneously, both successively, or only one of them. Note that with the classical fault tree, the successive case cannot be considered To explain how the results are obtained, let us consider the fire detection that uses a smoke detection followed by heat detection. Failure relationships represented in Table II, and by node  B2 in Table III , are explained with this logic structure:
• No fire alarm from the system during a fire if -no alarm from smoke detection function (the function is continuously inactive), AND -no alarm from heat detection function (the function is continuously inactive).
• False alarm from the system if -false alarm from smoke detection function (the function is continuously active), PAND -false alarm from heat detection function (the function is continuously active). Then, for each node of the rest of the hierarchical architecture, failure relationships are associated with the same principle for all functions until basic components are reached. The multi-fault tree for both dreaded events is detailed on Table III . This tree characterizes the behavior of the AFPS when a failure occurs thanks to the indirect relationships between failure component at the bottom of the decomposition, and failure of the missions at the top. 
1) Set of Optimal Operational Architectures:
Extensive evaluation of multi-fault tree and our optimization method leads to 74 optimal control architectures of the AFPS. Table IV synthesizes these solutions with respect to the two dreaded events. The number of optimal systems is given along with minimum cost, and maximum cost of these solutions; and for each optimal system, the methodology provides basic components, and their organization (type of redundancy, number and type of components, etc.). Table V shows some systems from Table IV whose is equal to 3 for both dreaded events. Note from this table that if components are added, the system's cost increases, and the parameter decreases for both dreaded events up to a precise level. For example, the solution with a cost of 31 units shows that the parameter increases for a dreaded event false alarm.
2) Comparison With Traditional Fault Trees:
We compare the proposed approach with a traditional dependability method that uses a classical fault tree. Let us recall that in classical fault trees, only AND and OR operators are used, and temporal aspects are not considered. Extensive evaluation of classical fault tree and optimization leads to 117 optimal control architectures. solutions for the multi-fault tree is smaller than the set of solutions for the classical tree, and the solutions proposed with the multi-fault are better from a dependability point of view, due to a lower number of scenarios for each dreaded event . These results are explained because multi-fault tree integrates temporal functions, which is not the case in the classical fault tree.
A particular optimal solution obtained with the proposed approach is shown on Fig. 8 . It costs 31 units, and its is 3 for both dreaded events. It uses two control systems in passive redundancy. The first control system uses 1 standard heat detector, 1 standard smoke detector, 1 standard PLC, 2 standard PLC with alarm priority, 2 and standard power supplies in passive redundancy. The second control system uses 1 standard smoke detector, 1 standard heat detector, 2 standard PLC without alarm priority, and 1 standard power supply. Both detection systems are used to detect successively smoke and heat.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a complete methodology to design dependable control systems was presented. The innovative feature of this methodology is that it attempts to take into account time-ordered sequences of failures. A new representation, called improved multi-fault tree, is defined. This tool allows us first to model failure relationships between functions, and second to evaluate the dependability level of a set of equipment architectures by the use of time-ordered sequences of failures. Our design method provides a set of optimal architectures with a given cost, and dependability level. The designer can choose among these solutions depending on the cost and dependability level specifications. The comparison between the new approach and the classical dependability method shows that the set of solutions for the multi-fault tree is smaller than the set of solutions for the classical one. The set is smaller, but the solutions are better because the new approach integrates temporal functions, and evaluates more precisely the level of dependability than does the traditional one. Future work will concern the enhancement of the comparison algorithm to be able to design more complex distributed systems, i.e. with a great number of functions and components, and with shared functions.
